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INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF CUSTODY DECREES
LAw AND REASON v. THE R.EsTATEMENT
Albert A. Ehrenzweig*
Introduction

A

FTER days of bitter contest, a weary judge dissolves the marriage
bond and, lacking Solomon's sword, allots the child to his mother.
Thus the stage is set for the second act of the tragedy. Craving a new
life for herself and her child, the mother moves to another state, and the
father, seeing his right of visitation thus put in jeopardy, pleads the
mother's removal in the original court which, loyal to the more faithful
citizen, now awards custody to him. Should a judge of the mother's
new home state heed this change? And again, what should be done
if the father, disappointed by the original court, uses the first visit to
acquire "possession" and himself removes the child to another state?
What is any judge to do when faced with vivid descriptions of a child's
plight caused by the alleged misdeeds of an absent parent or the "error"
of a distant court? Is he to give "full faith and credit" or "comity" to
the foreign court's decree and refuse to re-examine the merits of the
first award, or should he follow his own discretion in caring for the
welfare of the child now within his territory?
The courts' answers have been varied, as varied as human facts
and needs. But, increasingly, these answers have purported to follow
the Conflict of Laws Restatement of the American Law Institute1 providing that a foreign decree which creates "the status of custodianship"
(§144, comment a), "will be enforced" if the custody "has been
awarded by the proper courts" (§147), i.e., by "a court of the state of
domicile of the child" (§§145, 146). In such a case the award whose
"merits cannot be re-examined" (comment a to §147), can be altered,
it is said, only "for reasons which arise after the previous award"
(ibid.). Have these "rules" ever been the law? Should they be
the law?
The custody of children of divorced parents has occupied our
courts only for the last one hundred years. At the time Story wrote,
judicial custody awards were ordinarily made to guardians, since divorces were rare and usually reserved to the legislature.2 No wonder
* Professor of Law,

University of California School of Law, Berkeley.-Ed.
LAws RESTATEMENT (1934).
2 See, e.g., Pawling v. Bird's Exrs., 13 Johns. Rep. 192 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1816), involving a Massachusetts private statute awarding custody upon divorce.
1 CoNPLICT OF
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that the problem of recognition of foreign custody awards was treated
by Story under the heading of Foreign Guardianships, which included
those of parent guardians (the curators of Roman law ).8 In "close
analogy of the case of foreign executors and administrators,"4 the conflicts issue in this field was then, and is today, whether and how far a
guardian has "extraterritorial authority." Story, after a full discussion
of the laws of other countries,5 finds the rights and powers of guardians
in this country to be "strictly local."6 However doubtful the origin of
this doctrine and its support in authority,7 it must probably now be
considered as generally accepted in this country,8 though a complete
analysis of the case law might yet reveal that most pertinent cases may
be rationalized on equitable grounds such as a superior natural right to
custody,9 and though a general trend toward a loosening of Story's
rigid formula is unmistakable.10 The present discussion is limited to
foreign decrees awarding custody to either parent.
Conceivably, those parents who in the second half of the last
century began to seek and obtain the inclusion of custody awards in
judicial divorce decrees, could, in· conflicts cases, have continued to be
treated as guardians limited to "local" authority. Instead, however,
the problem of extraterritorial recognition of such custody awards began
to be examined along the same lines as of the divorce decree itself. We
find this approach in Minor's text, who considered a custody decree "as
STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON nm CONFLICT OF LAWS 411 (1834).
STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT oF LAWS, 4th ed., 845 (1852).
5 See LORENZEN AND STOMBERG, CAsEs AND MATERIALS oN THE CONFLICT oF LAws,
6th ed., 607, 619 (1951).
6 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 414 (1834).
7 Story relied merely on Chancellor Kent's decisions in Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch.
Rep. 153 (N.Y. 1814) (refusing payment of her infant's legacy to a mother appointed
guardian by a Pennsylvania court), and Kraft v. Wickey, 4 Gill & Johns. 332 (Md. 1832),
failing to concern questions of custody. The same two inconclusive cases have continued
to be invoked in guardianship cases, as supporting the ''local" theory. See, e.g., Woodworth
v. Spring, 4 Allen (86 Mass.) 321 (1862); Jones v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 P. 439
(1904).
8 See, e.g., Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 15 S.Ct. 590 (1895); In re Pratt, 219
Minn. 414, 18 N.W. (2d) 147 (1945).
9 See, e.g., the leading case of Foster v. Alston, 6 How. 406 (7 Miss. 1842), where a
mother, remarried and residing in Mississippi, prevailed, though having removed her
children "with an armed force," over their testamentary guardian in Tennessee. Significantly, the apparently oldest pertinent case relied on by the guardian and the dissenting
judge, King v. Hopkins and Wife, 7 East 579, 103 Eng. Rep. 224 (1806), concerned the
converse case of a child forcibly taken from his mother. See also Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga.
195, 81 Am. Dec. 202 (1862).
10 LoRENZEN AND STOMBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws,
2d ed., 618 (1951). See also notes, 49 CoL. L. REv. 104 (1949); 27 MICH. L. REv. 338
(1928). Some states draw different distinctions between "strict custody" and guardianship. See note, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 455 at 469 (1949).
8

4

1953]

INTERSTATE REcoGNITION OF CusTODY DECREES

347

much a decree in rem as is the divorce itself," the res being the "status"
of both parents and children with a "legal situs" at their domicile.11
Though this approach has been forcefully attacked as purely legalistic
and thus meaningless,1 2 it continues to haunt us, in Professor Beale's
version, in the above stated "rule" of the Restatement of the American
Law Institute concerning the required recognition of the foreign"created" status of custodianship.
For this "rule" Professor Beale13 relies on seven cases, only two of
which gave full faith and credit to a foreign decree and that presumably
on the mere ground that the child had been unlawfully removed from
the custodian.14 In all other cases recognition of a foreign modification
of an existing decree was refused (either because the child's domicile
was then in the forum15 or because of an intervening change of circumstances16 or because the foreign order itself had refused full faith and
credit to the order of the forum).17
The 1944 and 1948 collections by the American Law Institute of
cases citing the Restatemenf 8 list only thirteen cases among the
hundreds of custody cases decided since 1934, the year of the publication of the Restatement. And even of this negligible number only two
cases gave recognition to a sister state decree,19 while of the remaining
eleven cases, one concerned the decree of a foreign country,20 five did
not even involve foreign custody decrees, 21 one expressly refused to deal
with the question of recognition and re-examined the merits, 22 and four
cases actually refused recognition, either because of lack of foreign
11 Mmon, CoNFLICT OF LAws 208 (1901). For a similar statement see Rorum,
AMBRICAN !N-rBRSTATB LAw 183 (1879).
12 Cf. STOMBERG, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 2d ed., 326 (1951); also Stumberg, "The
Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws," 8 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 42 at 61 (1940).
18 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 719, n. 3 (1935). See also Beale, ''The Status of
the Child and the Conflict of Laws," 1 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 13 at 24 (1933).
14 Wilson v. Elliott, 96 Tex. 472, 73 S.W. 946, 75 S.W. 368 (1903); In re Leete,
205 Mo. App. 225, 223 S.W. 962 (1920). See infra text at note 83 et seq.
15 Groves v. Barto, 109 Wash. 112, 186 P. 300 (1919); Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 78,
187 P. 598 (1920); Barnes v. Lee, 128 Ore. 655, 275 P. 661 (1929).
10 See Woodland v. Woodland, 153 Ga. 202, 111 S.E. 673 (1922).
17 Dixon v. Dixon, 76 N.J. Eq. 364, 74 A. 995 (1909). See infra note 158.
18 RESTATEMENT IN THE CotmTS 256 (permanent edition 1945); 1948 SUPl'LEMENT
146 (1949).
19 McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P. (2d) 444 (1945); White v. White,
160 Kan. 32, 159 P. (2d) 461 (1945).
20 Hachez v. Hachez, 124 N.J. Eq. 442, 1 A. (2d) 845 (1938).
21 Butler v. Butler, 83 N.H. 413, 143 A. 471 (1928); Rosenberger v. Rosenberger,
(D.C. Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 349; Yarborough v. Yarborough (Stone, J., dissenting), 290
U.S. 202 at 223, n. 19 (1933)) (citing §156 of the Proposed Final Draft No. 1, preceding
Restatement §148); Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 375, 182 P. (2d) 824 (1947); Ex parte Olcott,
141 N.J. Eq. 8, 55 A. (2d) 820 (1947).
22Briggs v. Briggs, 111 Utah 418, 181 P. (2d) 223 (1947).
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jurisdiction23 or of a change of circumstances,24 or for other reasons. 25
Similar results .appear in later cases citing the Restatement in support.26
The present state of the law must, therefore, be ascertained without
regard to the authorities relying upon, or relied upon by, the Restaters.
When in 1944 Professor Stansbury examined sixty-odd cases to ascertain what the courts were actually doing, he found that in a substantial
majority of cases recognition for foreign custody decrees was refused. 21
And this finding is confirmed in the present analysis of well over one
hundred custody cases since decided. 28 Thus it might seem that little
attention is being paid to the rigid Restatement formula and that courts
have in fact exercised their free discretion in the paramount interest of
the child's welfare, while paying lip service to the Restatement.
Yet any dogmatic formula, even if merely used to disguise discretion,
should, if proved incorrect in law or reason, be discarded lest it somehow affect the administration of justice. All too easily, courts in this
field in which "words have been the chief trouble-makers" 29 might
take language at its face value and, treating freedom to modify a foreign
decree as an exception, automatically impose the burden of proof on
the parent seeking relief,30 or, on the other hand, following a few,
though isolated, precedents,31 completely reject any rule limiting their
right to disregard foreign proceedings. Such regrettable, necessarily
unsatisfactory, extreme conclusions could perhaps be avoided if an
analysis of dogmatic and case history should furnish us with a rule
expressing existing and desirable law more faithfully than does the
Restatement.
23 In re Saunders, 76 Cal. App.
24 Young v. Roe, 265 App. Div.

(2d) 635, 173 P. (2d) 818 (1946).
858, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 714 (1942), affd. 290 N.Y. 823,
50 N.E. (2d) 235 (1943); In re Adoption of Wyant, 72 Ohio App. 249, 51 N.E. (2d)
221 (1942).
25 Langan v. Langan, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 979.
26 See, e.g., In re Brown, 90 Cal. App. (2d) 651, 203 P. (2d) 799 (1949) (explainable under a "clean hands" doctrine, infra at note 112); Frick v. Kaufman, 310 Ky. 829,
222 S.W. (2d) 185 (1949) (semble); Daugherty v. Nelson, (Mo. App. 1950) 234 S.W.
(2d) 353; In re Hughes, 73 Ariz. 97, 237 P. (2d) 1009 (1951) (lack of foreign jurisdiction).
21 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines,'' IO I.Aw & Com.BM.
PROB. 819 at 828 (1944).
28 See infra note 32 et seq.
29 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," 10 I.Aw & CoNTEM.
PROB. 819 at 826 (1944).
80 Cf. STOMBERG, CoNI'LIC'l' oF LAws, 2d ed., 329 (1951); GooDRICH, CoNI'LIC'l' OF
LAws, 3d ed., 421 (1950). See also Goodrich, "Custody of Children in Divorce Suits,'' 7
CoRN. L.Q. 1 (1921); Stwnberg, "The Status of Children in the Conffict of Laws,'' 8
UNIV. Cm. L. R.Bv. 42 (1940); Beale, "The Status of the Child and the Conffict of Laws,"
1 UNIV. Cm. L. R.Bv. 13 (1933).
81 See infra notes 51 et seq.
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In view of the distinctive policies governing, and problems arising
as to, the recognition of decrees of sister states, these decrees will be
analyzed separately, leaving decrees of foreign countries to a subsequent
discussion. 31 a An attempt at formulating what I believe to be the "true
rule" will be preceded by a critical analysis of the case law in its
traditional classification under the headings of "jurisdiction" and
"h
c ange of·
circumstances."

I.

THE SHADOW OF THE RESTATEMENT

A. Nonrecognition of Foreign Awards
I. "No jurisdiction." "Running through the custody cases .
is a persistent assumption that some one state must have exclusive
jurisdiction. . . ."32 Professor Stansbury found in 1944 that about
one-half of those cases refusing to enforce the foreign decree did so
asserting a jurisdictional defect in that decree. 33 We find a similar proportion in the cases since decided.
Random analysis shows that this "jurisdictional" approach, far
from being dictated by logical necessity, is generally chosen in legalistic
support of more pertinent considerations, such as the unreliability, from
the standpoint of the child's welfare, of "migratory divorce" decrees3 4
or of custody awards made in the child's absence.35
This observation applies in particular to those cases constituting the
great majority of the decisions refusing to enforce foreign decrees on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., to those cases where the denial of recognition concerned the modification by a foreign court of its own custody
decree after the child's unlawful removal from its territory. Clearly a
court, having before him a child only recently entrusted to his mother
31a See my forthcoming article, ''International Recognition of Custody Decrees," 2
AM. J. CoMP. L. (1953), which is, in substance, based on my report to the Fourth Congress of the International Bar Association, July 1952, published by the Spanish Bar Association as ''El renoncimiento de los mandamientos de custodia extranjeros en los Estados
Unidos."
8 2 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," 10 I.Aw & CoNTEM.
PnoB. 819 at 830 (1944).
ss Id. at 826.
34 Cf. De Kraft v. Barney, Fed. Cas. No. 18,288 (1862), one of the earliest cases of
this type. See also Petition of Vetterlein, 14 R.I. 378 (1884); and for a recent decision
Hanson v. Hanson, 150 Neb. 337, 34 N.W. (2d) 388 (1948).
85 Cf. Callahan v. Callahan, 296 Ky. 444, 177 S.W. (2d) 565 (1944); Elkins v.
Elkins, 268 App. Div. 938, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 277 (1944), app. den. 268 App. Div. 1072,
52 N.Y.S. (2d) 939 (1944); Boor v. Boor, 241 Iowa 973,-43 N.W. (2d) 155 (1950).
See also Daugherty v. Nelson, (Mo. App. 1950) 234 S.W. (2d) 353, stressing the fact
that the child had been taken into Nebraska only for the purpose of giving that state
jurisdiction (at 358).
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by a foreign judge after full hearings in the presence of both parties,
will be reluctant to recognize a later decree of that judge in the father's
favor issued primarily, if not exclusively, on the ground that the mother
had "Hed" the jurisdiction. Judge Goodrich, however, in cases of this
type in which ''lack of jurisdiction" is so often invoked to "legalize"
common sense, £nds it "difficult to see how the .6.rst court's power is
lost as long as the question of custody remains to be passed upon."36
Omitting a long array of recent cases which have denied such
"power,"37 Judge Goodrich mentions three cases as supporting his
position,38 two of which were decided prior to 1890 and, besides, failed
to concern the recognition of a foreign modi.6.catory decree. 39
Whether or not justifiable on authority, the jurisdictional language
borrowed from the law of divorce will be found misleading and
unnecessary once it is recognized that the courts, on the one hand, will
use this language as just one of the several techniques to support their
claim to full discretion in custody matters, and on the other hand, will
refrain from such language where other equitable reasons require the
recognition of foreign decrees. This proposition will be more fully
established, I hope, by the present case analysis. But this much
should be clear at the outset: in divorce cases we are now witnessing
the gradual breakdown of that requirement of one spouse's domicile in
the state of the divorcing forum, which the courts, without any basis
in the Constitution, have come to assume following the "res" analogy
GooDRICH, CoNPLICT 011 LAws, 3d ed., 423 (1949).
See e.g. Keneipp v. Phillips, 210 Ark. 264, 196 S.W. (2d) 220 (1946); Gregory
v. Jackson, 212 Ark. 363, 205 S.W. (2d) 471 (1940) (though purportedly based on a
change of circumstances); In re Saunders, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 635, 173 P. (2d) 818
(1946); Hamilton v. Sourjohn, 332 ill. App. 279, 75 N.E. (2d) 42 (1947); Marlar v.
Howard, 312 Ky. 209, 226 S.W. (2d) 755 (1950); Abbott v. Abbott, 304 Ky. 167, 200
S.W. (2d) 283 (1947) [but cf. Beutel v. Beutel, 305 Ky. 683, 205 S.W. (2d) 489 (1947)];
People ex rel. Turk v. Turk, 86 N.Y.S. (2d) 139 (1949); Lacy v. Hitzemann, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945) 190 S.W. (2d) 764. See also supra note 15; and subsequent to Goodrich's
text, In re Hughes, 73 Ariz. 97, 237 P. (2d) 1009 (1951). But see, e.g., Bowman v.
Bowman, 313 Ky. 806, 233 S.W. (2d) 1020 (1950).
ss GooDRICH, CoNPLICT 011 LAws, 3d ed., 424, n. 90 (1949), citing Wakefield v.
Ives, 35 Iowa 238 (1872), infra notes 39, 167; Stetson v. Stetson, 80 Me. 483, 15 A. 60
(1888); State ex rel. Nipp v. District Court, 46 Mont. 425, 128 P. 590 (1912).
39 Wakefield v. Ives, supra note 38 (concerning recognition of an original decree based
on service by publication); Stetson v. Stetson, supra note 38 (concerning the forum's jurisdiction and not involving a foreign decree). The former case may have to be considered
as overruled by Kline v. Kline, 57 Iowa 386, 10 N.W. 825 (1881), where the court, without attempting to distinguish the Wakefield case, declared that, while service by publication was sufficient to support a divorce decree, it was not the proper basis for a custody
decree regarding children absent from the state. The court even intimated that it might
refuse to recognize a foreign custody decree if the children had been within the awarding
state at the time of the decree, apparently on the ground that "jurisdiction in rem" was
, not sufficient in such cases to compel full faith and credit. See infra notes 60, 146.
36

37
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now so generally abandoned. 40 We should be reluctant, for this if
no other reason, to introduce the problems and solutions in the law of
divorce jurisdiction into the :field of custody which is necessarily governed by different policies. Indeed, the "res" or status ideology,
though still entrenched in the Restatement and Judge Goodrich's
text,41 has lost ground more readily and thoroughly in that :field than
in the law of divorce. For, as Professor Stumberg, after a careful
analysis of the case law, concluded more than ten years ago, "technical
concepts of jurisdiction based on domicile and upon theoretical interest
by a state in its own domiciliaries seem far removed from problems of
child welfare." 42
Professors Stansbury and Stumberg suggest that residence-in-fact
has replaced domicile as a test of jurisdiction and that judicial acknowledgment of this fact would resolve the apparent conflict in the
decisions.43 I believe, however, that the ultimate remedy must be
sought at the source of the conflict: even those courts which on principle will give full faith and credit to foreign custody decrees are in no
way compelled by the Constitution to require, or be satisfied with, the
existence in the sister state of either domicile or residence. Indeed,
we are glad to :6.nd in more recent decisions that what Professor Stansbury still refers to as "an occasional recognition" of multistate jurisdiction44 in custody cases has been steadily gaining ground. 45 This
40 Against this analogy persuasively Stumberg, "The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 42 at 59 (1940).
41 GooDRICH, CoNPLicr OF 1.Aws, 3d ed., 422 (1949).
42 Stumberg, "The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws," 8 UNIV. Cm. L.
REv. 42 at 62 (1940).
43 Cf. STtIMBERG, CoNPLicr OF LAws, 2d ed., 327, 329 (1951); Stumberg, ''The
Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 42 at 58 (1940),
relying on tl;ie celebrated case of Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
But see Rheinstein, "Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody," 26 CoNN. B.J. 48, 60
(1952), stating that "in this country the concept of domicile has been so modified that it
has come to all practical effects to be equivalent with residence." See also notes, 81 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 970 (1933); 30 N.C.L. REv. 282 (1952); GooDRICH, CoNPLicr OF LAws,
3d ed., 423 (1949), who still claims on the authority of Professor Beale and two inconclusive cases [Pieretti v. Pieretti, 13 N.J. Misc. 98, 176 A. 589 (1935) (foreign country,
residence under statute); Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass. 562, 157 N.E. 621 (1927) (residence
under statute)], that exclusive domicile jurisdiction is "the view of the majority of the

cases."
44 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," IO LAw & CoNTEM.
PnoB. 819 at 831, n. 94 (1944), citing Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S.W. (2d)
220 (1941); White v. Shalit, 136 Me. 65, l A. (2d) 765 (1938); Goldsmith v. Salkey,
131 Tex. 139, ll2 S.W. (2d) 165 (1938).
45 See Justice Traynor in Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. (2d) 763 at 778, 197
P. (2d) 739 (1948): " •.. courts of two or more states may have concurrent jurisdiction over
the custody of a child." Cf. notes 47 Mrna L. REv. 703 (1949); 22 So. CAL. L. REv.
293 (1949). See also, e.g., Lynn v. Wright, 252 Ala. 606, 42 S. (2d) 490 (1949); and
Wilmot's Guardianship, (Ariz. 1952) 248 P. (2d) 995.
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theory which authorizes the courts of one state to pass upon a child's
custody without regard to whether the court of a sister state has done
so or is authorized and willing to do so, is, of course, equivalent to the
abandonment of any "juridictional test" of recognition.

2. "Change of circumstances." Increasingly hesitant to base their
decision to re-examine the merits of a foreign court's custody decree on
the lack of that court's jurisdiction, even those courts applying a jurisdictional approach often choose to justify their ruling on the alternative
ground of a change of circumstances since the foreign decree. 46 Indeed,
such a £nding appears in virtually all decisions refusing to recognize
foreign divorce decrees, even including those denying any duty of
recognition. It is this practice which apparently has resulted in the
doctrine, petri:6.ed in the Restatement that a foreign custody decree,
while enforceable if "awarded by the proper courts," may be re-examined "for reasons which arise after the previous award."47
It seems clear, however, and it has been stressed repeatedly, that
this limitation enables any court to reach the desired result by either
:6.nding or denying a change of circumstances. For, as the highest
court of Connecticut has pointed out in a much-quoted statement, "a
:6.nding of changed conditions is one easily made when a court is so
inclined," so that "the recognition extraterritorially which custody
orders will receive or cominand is liable to be more theoretical than of
great practical consequence."48 The danger inherent in the use of any
such arti:6.cial formula will appear where this formula proves inadequate notwithstanding its flexibility. Thus a California court, modifying a foreign decree, felt constrained to invoke a rule to the effect that
the required change of circumstances may refer to facts prior to that
decree. 49 Whatever the merit of this interpolation the justi:6.cation by a
"change of circumstances" of a decision granting or denying recognition
or enforcement to a foreign custody decree is rarely more than a manner
of speech supporting a preconceived result.
3. "Independent" investigation: the Kansas rule. It is apparently
for this reason that the courts of several states have abandoned any
46 See, e.g., Welker v. Welker, 325 Mass. 738, 92 N.E. (2d) 373 (1950). Cf. GoonRICH, CoNFLICT OF 1.Aws, 3d ed., 423 (1949).
47 See supra p. 345. For cases to the contrary see 9 A.L.R. (2d) 623 (1950).
48 Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 A. 1, 6 (1~)10). See also STUMBBRG, CoN•

FLICT OF 1.Aws, 2d ed., 328 (1951). Stumberg, id. at 329, n. 23, suggests, however, that
changed conditions should induce refusal of recognition "only exceptionally."
49 In re Svoboda's Guardianship, 92 Cal. App. (2d) 136, 206 P. (2d) 672 (1949).
Cf. this writer's comment in 2 StrnVBY OF CALIFORNIA I.Aw 120 (1950); and in general
9 A.L.R. (2d) 623 (1950); infra note 95.
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pretense of recognizing foreign decrees on grounds of either full faith
and credit or comity, and have claimed complete discretion in reexamining the merits of such decrees. While as late as 1944 Professor
Stansbury mentioned only three cases under this third category in
recognition cases,50 the reports of the past few years are replete with
such decisions.
This approach51 has been adopted most emphatically by the Supreme Court of Kansas. As recently as 1951 this court reviewed its
practice to this effect in the case of Moyer v. Moyer5 2 and, while
enforcing a California decree, protested its complete freedom to disregard foreign awards. The court quoted with approval the following
statement in Wear v. Wear5 3 : "As between the parents themselves,
they may be bound by a former adjudication ... but the state, in its
relation of parens patriae, looks to the welfare of the child at the time
the inquiry is being made, and for that purpose former adjudications
between parents is evidenciary [sic] only and not controlling."54 This
construction of a prior custody decree as not being res judicata as to the
child goes back to the much cited case of In re Borf 5 where the Kansas
court, as early as 1881, expressly repudiated the application of the full
faith and credit clause to foreign custody decrees in relation to the child.
Since both the Wear and the Bart cases have since been approved
and applied in several other Kansas cases,56 there can be no doubt but
that complete freedom in the examination of foreign custody decrees is
still the rule in Kansas. 57
50 Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," 10 LAw & CoNTEM.
PROB. 819 at 829, n. 75 (1944): People ex rel. Herzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39
N.E. (2d) 255 (1942); Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926); Ex parte Burns,
194 Wash. 293, 77 P. (2d) 1025 (1938).
51 Explanations vary greatly. It is said that custody decrees are not "final,'' that they
concern personal rather than property rights, that the child's interests are paramount, that
the state is a necessary party, or that the child was not a party to the prior award. For
authorities and criticism see note, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1024 at 1029 (1940). Cf. note 80
Umv. PA. L. REv. 712 at 717 (1932), advocating the Kansas rule, which in note 81
Umv. PA. L. REv. 970 at 973 (1933), is called "wrong under any civilized conllict of laws
principles."
52 Moyer v. Moyer, 171 Kan. 495, 233 P. (2d) 711 (1951).
58 Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606 (1930).
54Jd. at 224. The court cited Avery v. Avery, 33 Kan. 1, 5 P. 418 (1885), and In
re Hamilton, 66 Kan. 754, 71 P. 817 (1903).
55 In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881). See note, 80 Umv. PA. L. REv. 712 (1932).
56 Without referring to In re Bort, the court in Rodgers v. Rodgers, 56 Kan. 483, 43
P. 779 (1896), stated: " ••• it will not be claimed that the title to land or the custody of
children in one state can be settled by the decree of the courts of another •••" (at 488).
See Woodall v. Alexander, 107 Kan. 632, 193 P. 185 (1920); Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan.
946, 96 P. (2d) 849 (1939); White v. White, 160 Kan. 32, 159 P. (2d) 461 (1945).
57 But cf. STOMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 330 (1951), stating that In re Bort,
25 Kan. 308 (1881), was modified by White v. White, 160 Kan. 32, 159 P. (2d) 461
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While some states similarly inclined may have abandoned this
liberal approach presumably under the weight of contrary authority,58
at least one prominent court has recently indicated its willingness to
restore its earlier repudiation of full faith and credit to foreign custody
decrees. In Boardman 11. Boardman59 the highest court of Connecticut
has, with apparent approval, referred to the practice of "a number of
courts" which feel entitled to modify a foreign custody decree in the
interest of the child's welfare "even without proof of a change of circumstances."60 And the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
seems to entertain the same view,61 as do probably the courts of
Florida,61 a Nebraska,61 b New Jersey62 and Pennsylvania63 as well as
those of New York.
(1945). In the latter case, the court, however, while giving effect to a foreign decree in a
case involving an obvious attempt at evasion, and paying lip service to the Restatement,
expressly approved In re Bort, supra, as well as Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606
(1930), and Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946, 96 P. (2d) 849 (1939). Moloney v. Moloney,
163 Kan, 597, 185 P. (2d) 167 (1947), being based on estoppel, is not to the contrary.
Nor is Moloney v. Moloney, 167 Kan. 444, 206 P. (2d) 1076 (1949), which, while pur"
porting to approve the Restatement rule, actually denies recognition because of changed
circumstances.
58 See, e.g., Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E. (2d) 884 (1949), where the
North Carolina court, relying on Ex parte Means, 176 N.C. 307, 97 S.E. 39 (1918),
ignored the "free discretion" case of In re Alderman, 15TN.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (1911).
But cf. In re Biggers, 228 N.C. 743, 47 S.E. (2d) 32 (1948), citing the Alderman case
with approval (infra note 139); Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E. (2d) 861
(1951) (infra note 72); and Gofford v. Phelps, 235 N.C. 218, 69 S.E. (2d) 313 (1952).
59 Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A. (2d) 521 (1948). Noted in 24
N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. Rav. 615 (1949); 13 ALBANY L. Rav. 75 (1949); 23 CoNN. B.J. 68
(1949); Graveson, "Boardman v. Boardman through English Eyes," 23 CoNN. B.J. 173
(1949); Rheinstein, "Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody," 26 CoNN. B.J. 48 (1952).
60 Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124 at 137, 62 A. (2d) 521 (1948), citing In •
re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881); Barnett v. Blakeley, 202 Iowa 1, 209 N.W. 412 (1926)
[noted 25 MlCH. L. Rav. 536 (1927)] (apparently obsolete in the light of recent authority,
infra note 146); In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180 at 193, 38 N.W. 876 (1888) [concerning a
guardianship and cited in cases in effect recognizing foreign decrees, such as Ex parte
Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 256 N.W. 833 (1934)]. The court also referred to its own
decision to the same effect in Dunham v. Dunham, 97 Conn. 440, 117 A. 504 (1922),
stating with apparent regret that that decision was not reconcilable with its later decision
in Freund v. Burns, 131 Conn. 380, 40 A. (2d) 754 (1944). White v. White, 138 Conn.
l, 81 A. (2d) 450 (1951), is inconclusive in this respect. See infra note 145.
6l See Langan v. Langan, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 979; Boone v. Boone, (D.C.
Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 153. See also infra note 132.
61aLittle v. Franklin, (Fla. 1949) 40 S. (2d) 768. For other Florida cases see infra
notes 153 and 157.
61b See Application of Reed, 152 Neb. 819, 43 N.W. (2d) 161 (1950).
62 Ex parte Erving, 109 N.J. Eq. 294, 157 A. 161 (1931) relying on: In re Alder·
man, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (1911); Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606
(1930); Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N.W. 778 (1918) and People v. Allen, 105
N.Y. 628, 11 N.E. 143 (1883). Cf. note 32 CoL. L. Rav. 383 (1932). See also Hachez
v. Hachez, 124 N.J. Eq. 442, 1 A. (2d) 845 (1938); Ex parte Olcott, supra note 21; and
Brown v. Parsons, 136 N.J. Eq. 493, 42 A. (2d) 852 (1945) relying on the Erving case.
63 Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930) expressly
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It is true that the court of appeals of the last state in at least one
leading decision64 seemed to establish a rigid requirement of full faith
and credit to foreign decrees. 6 :, Recently, however, the lower courts
have shown their inclination to return to the doctrine announced in
People v. Allen66 and reaffirmed in People ex rel. Herzog v. Morgan67
according to which, in Judge Loughran's words, a foreign custody
decree cannot diminish "the prerogative of the New York Supreme
Court as parens patriae. 1168 In fact these courts have taken pains to
stress their freedom from full faith and credit even in those numerous
cases in which, for special typical reasons, more realistic than "lack of
jurisdiction" or "absence of change of circumstances," they have preferred to make their awards in conformity with foreign decrees, as
where they have chosen to enforce stipulations between the spouses69
or foreign decrees evaded by abduction.70
adhering to the Kansas rule, supra note 52 et seq. and quoting with approval In re Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (1911), has apparently never been overruled. The Pennsylvania Annotations to CoNFLicr OP LA.ws RESTATEMENT §147 consider this practice
reconcilable with the Restatement doctrine. Cf. to the same effect Commonwealth ex rel.
Graham v. Graham, 167 Pa. Super. 470, 75 A. (2d) 614 (1950), revd. on other grounds
367 Pa. 553, 80 A. (2d) 829 (1951). [The last decision can perhaps be rationalized on
the ground that it resulted in the child remaining within the court's jurisdiction.] See in
general Sweeney, "Habeas Corpus-Custody of Children," 22 TEMPLE L.Q. 289 (1949).
There are, however, some indications of a "clean hands" approach. See infra note 143.
Ansorge v. Armour, 267 N.Y. 492, 196 N.E. 546 (1935).
Cf. In re Forbell, 198 Misc. 753, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) 242 (1950); and People ex rel.
Tull v. Tull, 245 App. Div. 508, 283 N.Y.S. 183 (1935), affd. 270 N.Y. 619, 1 N.E.
(2d) 359 (1936) (foreign proceedings instituted by petitioner). Cf. note, 15 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 290 at 293 (1949).
66 People ex rel. Allen v. Allen, 105 N.Y. 628, 11 N.E. 143 (1887). See infra note
84.
67 People ex rel. Herzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39 N.E. (2d) 255 (1942).
68 Id. at 320. Cf. Ehrenpreis v. Ehrenpreis, 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 568 (1951), erroneously invoking Ansorge v. Armour, 267 N.Y. 492, 196 N.E. 546 (1935), for this proposition. See also infra notes 69, 70, 72.
69 Cf. In re Bagon, 277 App. Div. 1056, 100 N.Y.S. (2d) 745 (1950); Application
of Finston, 275 App. Div. 928, 90 N.Y.S. (2d) 201 (1948); Kudrna v. Kudrna, 88 N.Y.S.
(2d) 53 (1949); In re Hellman, 266 App. Div. 290, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 53 (1943), affd. 291
N.Y. 792, 53 N.E. (2d) 368 (1944); People ex rel. Michael v. Michael, 188 Misc. 901,
69 N.Y.S. (2d) 694 (1947); Ex parte Kananack, 272 App. Div. 783, 69 N.Y.S. (2d) 889
(1947). Cf. In re Harless, 192 Misc. 5, 80 N.Y.S. (2d) 98 (1948) (involving support
order); Application of Jiranek, 183 Misc. 704, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 849 (1944), modified on
other grounds 269 App. Div. 709, 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 36 (1945) (but invalidating agreement
to permit child to elect custodian).
10 See Forbell v. Forbell, 276 App. Div. 785, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) l (1949); and again
In re Forbell, 198 Misc. 753, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) 242 (1950), affd. 278 App. Div. 953, 105
N.Y.S. (2d) 992 (1951); People ex rel. Kniffin v. Kniffin, 184 Misc. 545, 56 N.Y.S. (2d)
108 (1945). But cf. Young v. Roe, 265 App. Div. 858, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 714 (1942).
64

65
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B. Recognition of Foreign Awards

In view of the latitude which courts have claimed and practiced in
denying recognition to foreign decrees, rationalization of the cases
granting such recognition seems difficult. Indeed, we find the reasons
given by the courts to be as varied and shifting as those given for nonrecognition, and as badly in need of a more realistic formulation.
Professor Stansbury mentions only one case in which the court in
effect enforced a foreign decree by denying its own jurisdiction.71
Though, since then, there have been several similar decisions,72 courts
refusing to re-examine foreign custody awards for reasons further to be
analyzed, have, in the vast majority of cases, tacitly or expressly,
assumed their, at least concurrent, jurisdiction, and declared themselves
bound by such awards by full faith and credit or otherwise, because of
the absence of a change of circumstances.
Constitutional full faith and· credit as a basis of decision appears as
early as 1872 when in Wakefield 17. foes, 73 custody was awarded in
accordance with a foreign divorce decree with express reference to
that rule. 74 Equally early a similar compulsion was found outside the
Constitution in Bennett 17. Bennett75 where, in 1867, a federal district
court sitting in Oregon, held a California decree "conclusive upon the
parties to it, throughout the United States," 76 and in those many cases
in which "comity" was accorded to foreign decrees.
Since that time the question of the basis of recognition has remained unresolved with the courts interchangeably using available
language. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the only case
dealing with this problem, has signally failed to decide the issue. In
fact, majority opinion and dissent reflect the Court's division on this
point.
71 Jones v. McCloud, 19 Wash. (2d) 314, 142 P. (2d) 397 (1943). See infra at
note 120 et seq.
72 Cf. In re Forbell, 198 Misc. 753, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) 242 (1950) (supra note 70);
In re Morgan, 192 Misc. 352, 80 N.Y.S. (2d) 472 (1948), modified on other grounds
301 N.Y. 127, 93 N.E. (2d) 336 (1950); Farrell v. Ellsworth, 52 N.Y.S. (2d) 513
(1944); Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E. (2d) 86 (1951) (supra note 58);
Sadler v. Sadler, 234 N.C. 49, 65 S.E. (2d) 345 (1951); supra notes 69 and 70.
73 Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Iowa 238 (1872). This approach seems to have been retained
in Iowa. See infra note 166.
74 Id. at 240. See also 1 WHAI!.TON, CoNFLICT OP LA.ws, 2d ed., 530 (1905). There
has been much early doubt as to the effect of the full faith and credit clause upon foreign
judgments. Cf., e.g., Pawling v. Bird's Exrs., 13 Johns. Rep. 192, 205 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1816).
75 Bennett v. Bennett, 3 Fed. Cas. 212 (1867).
76 Id. at 214.
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In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey' 7 the Court, affirming a
New York order which had modified a Florida custody award, denied
violation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution on the
narrow ground that Florida law would have permitted this modification
and "what Florida could do modifying the decree, New York may
do." 78 Expressly reserving decision "whether the power of New York
to modify the custody decree was greater than Florida's power,"79 the
Court refrained from examining the applicability of the full faith and
credit clause to custody decrees as such. Justice Frankfurter, however,
while concurring on other grounds, would have expressly denied New
York courts the right "on independent consideration" to modify the
Florida decree without reliance on "changed circumstances,"80 thus implying his acceptance of full faith and credit to custody decrees of
sister states.81
That Justice Frankfurter's proposition would not, any more than
the majority's presumably contrary approach, solve the problem has
been pointed out above. Even formal recognition of full faith and
credit to foreign custody decrees would leave courts quite free to disregard such decrees at will, with neither "jurisdiction" nor "change of
circumstances" rationalizing the division of authority. Only a factual
analysis of the case law can reveal the courts' real motivation and thus
promote the understanding and the predictability of their decisions.
This analysis is here attempted.

II.

THE TRUE RuLE

A. "Clean Hands"
We have seen, and it should be obvious, that custody decrees require special treatment for purposes of foreign recognition. Not only
are such decrees subject to change at any time but consideration for the
child's welfare precludes the settlement of a dispute between hostile
spouses from becoming binding on their child which has lacked independent representation in these proceedings. The primary principle
in this field should be, therefore, and is in fact, the court's discretion
exclusively governed by the child's welfare. Contrary to the Restatement rule, neither full faith and credit nor comity can be expected or
77New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903 (1947).
78 Id. at 614.
10 Id. at 615.
so Id. at 616, 617.
8 1 But cf. Justice Stone's dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 at 213,
214, 54 S.Ct. 181 (1933).
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given at the expense of this discretion beyond the weight given to prior
domestic decrees.
There is one type of case, however, in which a deviation from this
principle by the practice of "comity" seems required in the interest of
both the child and society, and where the Kansas rule of full discretion
does not represent either existing or desirable law. This is the case of
·the parent who, dissatisfied with a custody award, seeks a redetermination of the issue in the court of another state. To encourage such
scheming is clearly harmful particularly where the second court's jurisdiction has been obtained in bad faith. It is true that the parent's
wrong by itself should not preclude a solution dictated by the child's
interest, and many courts have so said. But as Professor Stansbury
suggested, even without regard to any wrong done, "stability of environment ... in itself is an important factor in the welfare of the child."8 !'<
That this factor has been widely taken into account is generally
conceded. But what is not known is the predominant significance of
this factor in custody cases, revealed by the case analysis here undertaken. It appears from this analysis that, on the one hand, in most
cases in which courts have refused to re-examine foreign custody decrees, the spouse seeking such re-examination was a fugitive from the
state issuing such decree; and that, on the other hand, this element was
usually absent where courts consented to the use of their independent
discretion. It is here, and only here, that the Restatement rule may
claim validity.
Thus, it is not surprising to :find that the very cases relied on by
Professor Beale for his (general) recognition rule were decided against
a spouse defying the foreign court.83 So was the early recognition case
of People v. Allen84 where the court's apprehension that the father
might "again surreptitiously remove the children to another State"811
probably determined the court in refuting the Kansas doctrine of free
discretion. In the even earlier case of Taylor v. Jeter8 6 the court had
expressly refused to avail itself "of a tort to wrest from [the court] of
Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," 10 LAw & CoNTEM.
819 at 829, n. 76 (1944).
83 Supra note 14.
84 People ex rel. Allen v. Allen, 40 Hun 61 l (N.Y. 1886), appeal dismissed on other
ground 105 N.Y. 628, 11 N.E. 143 (1887).
85 People ex rel. Allen v. Allen, 40 Hun 611 at 621 (N.Y. 1886); supra note 66.
86 Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195, 81 Am. Dec. 202 (1862). For more recent Georgia
cases see infra note 133.
82

PROB.

1953]

INTERSTATE REcoGNITION OF CusTODY DECREES

359

a sister State a jurisdiction properly appertaining" to it.87 And analySis
of the subsequent practice permitted Professor Stansbury to report that
in more than one-half of the cases examined by him in which the
custody orders of a sister state were respected and carried out, the child
had been abducted from the complaining parent or brought into the
forum in defiance of such orders,88 or retained by the resident parent
on the occasion of a casual visit or health pilgrimage to the forum. 89
Professor Stansbury's additional finding that, on the other hand, the
bulk of the cases in which recognition of a foreign custody decree was
refused without the showing of changed circumstances, concerned
foreign divorce decrees attempting to affect either a custody lawfully
held by a resident of the forum or concerning a resident child,90 further
supports the assumption that the petitioner's "clean hands" are the most
important criterion for the application for any one of the tools available to courts desirous of re-examining the merits of a foreign decree.
In recent years decisions granting full faith and credit or comity
to decrees of foreign courts disobeyed by the losing parent have been
numerous. In fact, such decisions constitute about two-thirds of the
approximately fifty cases which since 1944 (the year of Professor Stansbury's conclusions) have wholly or partly refused re-examination of
foreign decrees. If these cases are added to those in which re-examination was actually decided upon, substantially less than fifteen per cent
of recent custody cases can be held to support the Restatement rule
requiring on principle recognition of foreign decrees.
33 Ga. 195 at 203.
"Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," 10 LAw & CoNTEM.
PRoB. 819 at 829 (1944), citing the following cases: Bums v. Shapley, 16 Ala. App. 297,
77 S. 447 (1917); State v. Black, 239 Ala. 644, 196 S. 713 (1940); Ex parte Livingston,
108 Cal. App. 716, 292 P. 285 (1930); Drake v. Drake, 187 Ga. 423, 1 S.E. (2d) 573
(1939); Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S.W. (2d) 220 (1941); Evens v. Keller,
35 N.M. 659, 6 P. (2d) 200 (1931); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83, 289 P. 740
(1930); Jones v. McCloud, 19 Wash. (2d) 314, 142 P. (2d) 397 (1943). See also supra
note 14.
89 Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719, 68 P. (2d) 719 (1937); Wear v. Wear, 130
Kan. 205, 285 P. 606 (1930); Hachez v. Hachez, 124 N.J. Eq. 442, 1 A. (2d) 845
(1938); Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1917).
90 Ex parte Inman, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 130, 89 P. (2d) 421 (1939); People ex rel.
Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 27 P. (2d) 1038 (1933); Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho
512, 269 P. 987 (1928); Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946, 96 P. (2d) 849 (1940); Ex parte
Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 256 N.W. 833 (1934); Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139,
112 S.W. (2d) 165 (1938); Elliott v. Elliott, 181 Ga. 545, 182 S.E. 845 (1935); MacNeill v. McElroy, 193 Ga. 55, 17 S.E. (2d) 169 (1941); McAdams v. Mcferron, 180
Miss. 644, 178 S. 333 (1938); Bourn v. Hinsey, 134 Fla. 404, 183 S. 614 (1938).
87

88 Stansbury,
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An analysis of the case laws of those states in which the recognition of foreign custody awards has been most frequently or significantly
litigated in recent years will illustrate the increasing relevance of what
I have termed the doctrine of "clean hands."
B. California
Since the supreme court of the state, in its recent foreign custody
decision of Sampsell v. Superior Court,91 despite much excellent language, failed to decide the full faith and credit issue, the lower courts
have continued to rely for guidance on Foster v. Foster 2 which since
1937 has been the leading authority in this field.
In that case the supreme court, refusing to modify a South Dakota
decree dividing custody between the two parents, approved several
statements which seem to support the proposition that "a decree of a
court of one state having jurisdiction, relating to the custody of minor
children is under the doctrine of comity prevailing among sister states
and, subject of course to the right of the parties to show a change of
circumstances or conditions, entitled to recognition in another state."93
Though, moreover, the trial court's assumption that "the decree of the
South Dakota court was entitled to full faith and credit''9 4 was held
correct "on ample authority," the supreme court does not seem to have
thought in terms of constitutional compulsion. This becomes entirely
clear from the court's remark that this rule was not "absolutely ironclad" but that there might be cases in which, even in the absence of a
change of circumstances, "the welfare of the child might require that
the previous order of custody be changed."95 It is apparently by virtue
of this limitation diat the District Court for. the Second District
91 Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. (2d) 763, 197 P. (2d) 739 (1948), recognizing "concurrent jurisdiction" in interstate cases. But see as to intrastate conHicts Greene v.
Superior Court, 37 Cal. (2d) 307, 231 P. (2d) 821 (1951). Cf. my comments in 1 SunVEY oF CALIFORNIA LAw 99 (1949); 2 id. 121 (1940); 3 id. 144 (1951).
92 Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719, 68 P. (2d) 719 (1937). See in general, note 37
CALIF. L. REv. 455 (1949).
93 Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719 at 727 (1937), quoting with approval the quotation, in In re Livingston, 108 Cal. App. 716, 292 P. 285 (1930), of In re Marshall, 100
Cal. App. 284, 279 P. 834 (1929).
94 Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719 at 728 (1937).
95 lbid. See also Lerner v. Superior Court, (Cal. 1952) 242 P. (2d) 321 at 324,
assuming that a "California decree would receive the same respect in other states that
foreign custody decrees receive in our courts."
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felt justified in Dotsch v. Grimes, 96 to affirm the modification of an
Ohio decree without requiring proof of a change of circumstances,
relying inter alia on the language of the supreme court in Titcomb v.
Superior Court,9"• approved in the Foster case,98 to the effect that in the
absence of a change of circumstances the court "may," rather than
"must," refuse to decree a change of custody.99 And we should note in
this connection that several older cases claiming the court's free discretion unhampered by full faith and credit have never been disapproved.100 In the light of this interpretation of the Foster case those
decisions of the courts for the First:1°1 and Second 102 Districts, which
have relied on the Foster case as postulating full faith and credit for
foreign decrees, require a rationalization to be gained only from a
further factual analysis. It is submitted that this analysis supports the
"clean hands" approach here suggested.
Begirining in 1945 with Guardianship of Cameron,1° 3 California
courts, in most if not all cases in which foreign custody decrees were
recognized or enforced, have so held against a spouse defying the foreign decree. This was true in In re Kyle,1° 4 as it was in In re
Bauman,1°5 where Judge Peters pointed out expressly that "the
96Dotsch v. Grimes, 75 Cal. App. (2d) 418, 171 P. (2d) 506 (1946).
97Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34 at 39, 29 P. (2d) 206 (1934).
98 Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719 at 728 (1937).
99 Dotsch v. Grimes, 75 Cal. App. (2d) 418 at 420, 171 P. (2d) 506 (1946).
100 In re Kyle, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 634, 176 P. (2d) 96 (1947), giving full faith and
credit in a case of abduction, disposes of three of these cases [Anthony v. Tarpley, 45 Cal.
App. 72 at 79, 187 P. 779 (1919); Warren v. Warren, 127 Cal. App. 231, 15 P. (2d)
556 (1932); In re Culp, 2 Cal. App. 70, 83 P. 89 (1905)] as containing mere dicta to
the opposite effect. See also Di Giorgio v. Di Giorgio, 87 Cal. App. (2d) 576, 197 P. (2d)
213 (1948), failing to discuss authority and never relied on subsequently in a conllicts case
(infra note 161).
101 In re Dean, 90 Cal. App. (2d) 177, 202 P. (2d) 845 (1949); In re Bauman, 82
Cal. App. (2d) 359, 186 P. (2d) 384 (1947); In re Kyle, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 634, 176
P. (2d) 96 (1947).
102 1n re Brown, 90 Cal. App. (2d) 651, 203 P. (2d) 799 (1949); Koebrich v.
Simpson, 87 Cal. App. (2d) 848, 197 P. (2d) 820 (1948); In re Memmi, 80 Cal. App.
(2d) 295, 181 P. (2d) 885 (1947); Guardianship of Cameron, 66 Cal. App. (2d) 884,
153 P. (2d) 385 (1944).
103 Guardianship of Cameron, 66 Cal. App. (2d) 884, 153 P. (2d) 385 (1944),
relying on Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719, 68 P. (2d) 719 (1937), and In re Wenman,
33 Cal. App. 592, 165 P. 1024 (1917).
104 In re Kyle, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 634, 176 P. (2d) 96 (1947), relying on Foster v.
Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719 (1937) (mother unlawfully retaining children).
10 5 In re Bauman, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 359, 186 P. (2d) 384 (1947), relying on Foster
v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719 (1937), and In re Kyle, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 634 (1947).
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'changed circumstances' required by the rule cannot be that the mother
has improperly and in violation of a court order removed the child to
another state."100 And the clean hands rationale of recognition was
reiterated in the next case of In re Memmi107 where the court found
itself "faced with a situation wherein the minor child was brought into
this state in defiance of a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction of
a sister state."108 Again, in Koebrich v. Simpson,1° 9 in the same year,
full faith and credit under the Federal Constitution was expressly
based on the fact that the child "had been brought here wrongfully by
petitioner for the purpose of avoiding and circumventing the decree of
the New Mexico court."11 ° Foster v. Foster was distinguished on that
ground. 111
Finally, several cases most recently decided, while not expressly
relying on the fact of defiance, mention this fact more or less prominently .112 Even the District Court for the Third District which so far
has shown some reluctance against committing itself to this practice
indicated in at least one recent case that it might give decisive weight
to defiance to a foreign decree.113
No additional case authority seems needed to support the proposition that California courts will recognize and enforce foreign custody
106 In

re Bauman, supra note 105, at 364.
re Memmi, 80 Cal. App. (2d) 295, 181 P. (2d) 885 (1947), relying on In re
Wenman, 33 Cal. App. 592, 165 P. 1024 (1917); In re Marshall, 100 Cal. App. 284, 279
P. 834 (1929), and In re Kyle, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 634, 176 P. (2d), supra note 104.
10s In re Meinmi, supra note 107, at 300.
109 Koebrich v. Simpson, 87 Cal. App. (2d) 848, 197 P. (2d) 820 (1948), relying
on Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719 (1937); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83, 289 P.
740 (1930); McMlllin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P. (2d) 444 (1945); Jones v.
McCloud, 19 Wash. (2d) 314, 142 P. (2d) 397 (1943).
110 Koebrich v. Simpson, supra note 109, at 849.
111 Id. at 850. But cf. Lerner v. Superior Court, 242 P. (2d) 321 at 324, where
disobedience in the Foster case to the South Dakota decree was stressed.
112 In re Brown, 90 Cal. App. (2d) 651, 203 P. (2d) 799 (1949), relying on Foster
v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719 (1937); In re Dean on behalf of Swindall, 90 Cal. App. (2d)
177, 202 P. (2d) 845 (1949), relying on In re Bauman, supra note 105; Foster v. Foster,
supra; In re Kyle, supra note 107.
_
113 Application of Kosh, 105 Cal. App. (2d) 418, 233 P. (2d) 598 (1951), granting
custody to a mother in modification of an lliinois decree, although the mother had departed
with the child during the lliinois proceedings. The court pointed out, however, that she
was then "under no restraint" from the lliinois court. Id. at 423. In Brown v. Brown, 104
Cal. App. (2d) 88, 230 P. (2d) 651 (1951), the same court, while refusing recognition
notwithstanding the petitioner's malfeasance, was apparently at least partially determined by
the fact that the foreign court itself had failed to give full faith and credit to a prior
California decree.
101 In
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decrees without re-examination of their merits mainly, if not exclusively, in view of a malfeasance by the parent seeking such reexamination. But we may also refer to those cases in which courts have
refused such recognition or enforcement and insisted on an independent examination of the merits. It will be found that in nearly all such
cases the element of malfeasance was absent. Thus, the only recent
case where the court, notwithstanding several pronouncements to the
contrary, in effect denied the applicability of the full faith and credit
clause to custody decrees, modification was sought and obtained by a
bona fide resident. 114 This was also true in those three older
cases which (though distinguished) were relied on by the spouse
opposing recognition in the leading case of In re Kyle,115 as well
as in a recent decision of the Fourth District where modilication of a
Florida decree was granted.116
In the light of this highly consistent practice of the California
courts, Foster v. Foster- 17 must, I believe, be read as establishing the
principle that foreign custody decrees are subject to an independent
re-examination by the California courts in the interest of the child,
though this discretion will as a rule not be exercised where the spouse
in seeking relief in the courts of California has defied foreign proceedings or decrees. This interpretation of the Foster case is further
supported by the court's quotation of the "correct rule" in Crater v.
Crater,118 according to which in all custody cases "the court, in revising
and modifying its decree," inter alia should give weight to "the conduct
of the parties."119
·

C. The Washington Rule
The clearest and most consistent expression, however, has been
given to this policy by the Supreme Court of Washington which in an
114Dotsch

v. Grimes, 75 Cal. App. (2d) 418, 171 P. (2d) 506 (1946).

1lli In re Kyle,
116 Di Giorgio

77 Cal. App. (2d) 634, 176 P. (2d) 96 (1947).
v. Di Giorgio, 87 Cal. App. (2d) 576, 197 P. (2d) 213 (1948).
117Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. (2d) 719, 68 P. (2d) 719 (1937).
118 Crater v. Crater, 135 Cal. 633, 67 P. 1049 (1902), quoted in Foster v. Foster,
supra note 117 at 732.
119 Crater v. Crater, supra note 118, at 634 (Italics added). Support may also be found
in Justice Traynor's opinion in Greene v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. (2d) 307 at 312, 231
P. (2d) 821 (1951), which though concerning an intrastate conllict and expressly distinguishing interstate recognition, seems pertinent in basing a finding of exclusive jurisdiction on a policy of precluding "search of a court that will alter the custody provisions of
a divorce decree." Cf. ex parte Lukasik, 108 Cal. App. (2d) 438, 239 P. (2d) 492 (1951).
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impressive line of cases has refused to take jurisdiction when requested
to modify a foreign custody decree in violation of which the court's
action was sought.
The origin and development of this rule was recently reviewed in
Ex parte Mullins. 120 An Ohio court had granted custody to the mother,
limited by certain rights of visitation by the father. When, however,
two years later she refused to obey the order to return from a visit to
Washington, the Ohio court granted full custody to the father. In
habeas corpus proceedings brought by him in Washington the supreme
court of that state in a unanimous decision reversed a judgment
denying the writ, on the ground that only domiciliary jurisdiction
would justify refusal to enforce the Ohio decree; that "all reasonings
and ideas of fair play and justice demand a holding that a parent acting
in disobedience to an order of a court, cannot secure a new domicile
for his or her child";121 and that "to hold otherwise would be to put
a premium upon wrongdoing by allowing a parent to gain an advantage
by disobeying the orders of a court."122 Distinguishing cases seemingly
to the contrary,1 23 the court mentions, but does not rely on McClain v.
McClain as the first case taking into account in enforcing a foreign
decree at least incidentally,124 the respondent's malfeasance. For its
theory that the disobedient parent, not having acquired a Washington
domicile, could not avail himself of the courts of this state to obtain
modification of a foreign decree, the court found support in Motichka
125
11. Rollands,
as it did in In re Burns1 26 and Jones 11. McCloud1 21 for
its policy against the encouragement of taking children from one jurisdiction to another to defeat a decree of a sister state. And finally,
120 Ex parte Mullins, 26 Wash. (2d) 419, 174 P. (2d) 790 (1946).
121 Id. at 445.
122 Id. at 43 I.
123 Kentzler v. Kentzler, 3 Wash. 166, 28 P. 370 (1891) (parol evidence as to foreign
decree held inadmissible); In re Groves, 109 Wash. 112, 186 P. 300 (1919) (no full faith
and credit to modification by court of original jurisdiction after lawful removal of child to
Washington).
124McClain v. McClain, 115 Wash. 237, 197 P. 5 (1921) revd. on rehearing 202 P.
173 (1921). The court in that case added (at 174): "Notwithstanding the father's course
is to be condemned, yet if we were of the opinion that it were for the best interest of the
boy to leave him with the father and stepmother we would so order."
125 Motichka v. Rollands, 144 Wash. 565, 258 P. 333 (1927), followed in Ex parte
Penner, 161 Wash. 479, 297 P. 757 (1931).
126 Ex parte Bums, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P. (2d) 1025 (1938).
127 Jones v. McCloud, 19 Wash. (2d) 314, 142 P. (2d) 397 (1943), supra note 71.

1953]

365

INTERSTATE REcoGNITION OF CusTODY DECREES

State ex rel. Marthens v. Superior Court1 28 was held to have furnished
a precedent for the court's present holding.

D. Other States
At least two jurisdictions have expressly adopted the Washington
rule: Tennessee in State ex rel. French v. French,1 29 and Colorado in
McMillin v. McMillin. 130 Alabama has independently developed the
same approach. In the leading case of State v. Black the Supreme
Court of Alabama announced that when a child is wrongfully brought
into their jurisdiction, the courts, "recognizing the sovereign authority
of a sister state in respect thereto, as a matter of comity, will refuse to
deal with the question relating to the future welfare of the child...."130a
While reserving to themselves full discretion in the interest of the
child's welfare, by denying either the applicability of the full faith and
credit clause to custody decrees or the foreign court's "jurisdiction," or
by a liberal use of the change of circumstances rule, a large number of
jurisdictions have clearly shown their inclination to recognize or enforce foreign custody decrees in cases of defiance against such decrees. ·
Arkansas 131 the District of Columbia 132 Georoia 133 Idaho 133 a Ken'

1 28

'

b

'

'

Marthens v. Superior Court, 25 Wash. (2d) 125, 169 P. (2d) 626 (1946).
State ex rel. French v. French, 182 Tenn. 606, 188 S.W. (2d) 603 (1945),
followed in Cecil v. State, 192 Tenn. 74, 237 S.W. (2d) 558 (1951).
1ao McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P. (2d) 444 (1945), relying, in addition to the Washington cases, also on Guardianship of Cameron, 66 Cal. App. (2d) 884,
153 P. (2d) 385 (1944). Accord, Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P. (2d) 311
(1950) (with significant language). See also Crocker v. Crocker, (10th Cir. 1952) 195
F. (2d) 236, infra note 149a. People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 27 P. (2d)
1038 (1933), was not to the contrary (as alleged in 107 A.L.R. 642) since it refused
recognition to a foreign modification order after removal from the state. See infra notes 150,
159.
130a State v. Black, 239 Ala. 644 at 647, 196 S. 713 (1940), cited with approval on
this point in Moss v. Ingram, 246 Ala. 214, 20 S. (2d) 202 (1944), and distinguished in
Ferguson v. State, 251 Ala. 645, 38 S. (2d) 853 (1949) (infra note 155). This rule
seems to have been consistently adhered to at least since Burns v. Shapley, 16 Ala. App.
297, 77 S. 447 (1917), cited with approval in Lynn v. Wright, 34 Ala. App. 492, 42 S.
(2d) 484 (1949); Little v. 'Little, 249 Ala. 144, 30 S. (2d) 386 (1947).
1 3 1 Gregory v. Jackson, 212 Ark. 363, 205 S.W. (2d) 471 (1947) [cited with approval
in Turner v. Dodge, 212 Ark. 991, 208 S.W. (2d) 467 (1948)], refusing to recognize the
modification of an Oregon decree made in the mother's favor after the father had removed
the children to Arkansas. By stressing the lawful character of that removal the court may
have indicated its approval of the clean hands doctrine. See also Keneipp v. Phillips, 210
Ark. 264, 196 S.W. (2d) 471 (1940). For other authorities to the same effect, see note,
2 Ame. L. REv. 78 (1948).
12 9
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tucky,134 Mississippi,1 35 Missouri,1 36 New Mexico,137 New York,1 88
North Carolina 139 Ohio 140 Oklahoma 141 Oregon 142 Pennsylvania 143

'

'

'

'

'

1 32 Slack v. Perrine, 9 App. D.C. 128 at 155 (1896): "That a litigant, by violating
the confidence of the court, and in direct contempt of its authority, can wholly defeat its
jurisdiction by absconding with the thing or person that is the subject of contention is an
inconceivable proposition." See also Boone v. Boone, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 14,
cert. den. 319 U.S. 762 (1943); and also supra note 61. Kirk v. Kirk, (D.C. Cir. 1945)
150 F. (2d) 589, can perhaps be distinguished on the ground that it involved a contest
between a (victorious though defiant) mother and a grandmother. See also infra note 151.
1 33 Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195, 81 Am. Dec. 202 (1862). While apparently never
more fully expressed in later cases, the clean hands approach probably underlies decisions
such as Milner v. Gatlin, 139 Ga. 109, 76 S.E. 860 (1912); Stallings v. Bass, 204 Ga. 3,
48 S.E. (2d) 822 (1948); and even more clearly, Shivers v. Shivers, 206 Ga. 552, 57 S.E.
(2d) 660 (1950), and Grant v. Grant, 202 Ga. 40, 41 S.E. (2d) 534 (1947) (denying
full faith and credit in an abduction case on grounds of "jurisdiction"). See infra note 160.
l33a See Ex parte Derr, 70 Idaho 527, 224 P. (2d) 306 (1950) (modification of
Oregon decree where the child "was not brought to the State of Idaho by stealth or fraud
or in violation of the terms of the Oregon decree") and cases discussed therein; also Clemens v. Kinsley, (Idaho 1951) 239 P. (2d) 266 (child removed prior to appeal). Cf. infra
note 159.
134 Shippen v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10, 196 S.W. (2d) 425 (1946). While refusing to
recognize a ten year old Ohio decree giving custody to the mother, the court ordered the
father, a resident of the forum, to surrender the children unlawfully abducted to Louisiana
from custody in Pennsylvania, and to seek relief at the children's domicile. The court felt
that, though many reasons favored the father in view of the change of several circumstances
since the issuance of the Ohio decree, "the manner in which this father obtained the
custody of these children cannot under· any circumstances be sanctioned by the courts"; and
that "to adjudge their custody to him under these circumstances would put the stamp of
judicial approval upon that wrongful act" (at 14). See also Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky.
804, 155 S.W. (2d) 220 (1941); Frick v. Kaufman, 310 Ky. 829, 222 S.W. (2d) 185
(1949) (decision• against father to return the child after temporary visit); notes, 31 KY.
L.J. 287 (1943), 81 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 970 (1933). And cf. Marlar v. Howard, 312 Ky.
209, 226 S.W. (2d) 755 (1949), distinguishing Beutel v. Beutel, 305 Ky. 683, 205 S.W.
(2d) 489 (1947), on similar grounds.
135 See Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12 S. (2d) 425 (1943). For an intrastate
application of this principle see Leggett v. Leggett, 202 Miss. 435, 32 S. (2d) 189 (1947).
Haynie v. Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 85 S. 99 (1920), can probably be distinguished on the
ground that the contest was between a parent and a more distant relative. See also Campbell v. Lovgren, 175 Miss. 4, 166 S. 365 (1936).
136 Wood v. Wood, (Mo. App. 1950) 231 S.W. (2d) 882; Ex parte Lofts, (Mo. App.
1949) 222 S.W. (2d) 101; Daugherty v. Nelson, (Mo. App. 1950) 234 S.W. (2d) 353.
See also Application of Shreckengaust, (Mo. App. 1949) 219 S.W. (2d) 244. Cf. Dawson
v. Dawson, (Mo. App. 1951) 241 S.W. (2d) 725.
1s1 Wise v. Wise, 55 N.M. 461, 235 P. (2d) 529 (1951); Evens v. Keller, 35 N.M.
659, 6 P. (2d) 200 (1931); note, 81 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 970 (1933). Albright v. Albright,
45 N.M. 302, 115 P. (2d) 59 (1941), may be distinguishable on the ground that that
case refused recognition to a foreign modification decree (infra note 151); and Mylius v.
Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 P. 918 (1914), on the ground that the court justified the
children's unlawful removal.
188 See Forbell v. Forbell, 276 App. Div. 785, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 1 (1949), supra note
70; People ex rel. Kniffin v. Kniffin, 184 Misc. 545, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 108 (1945).
189 Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E. (2d) 861 (1951) (decision against
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and Texas1 44 would seem to fit into this fast-growing pattern. And there
are some indications that Connecticut,145 Iowa,1 46 Kansas,147 Massachusetts147a and Utah148 might come to join this list which, counting
father retaining visiting children contrary to Virginia decree). Neither support nor rejection of this approach can be had from Gofford v. Phelps, 235 N.C. 218, 69 S.E. (2d) 313
(1952) (no foreign jurisdiction); Sadler v. Sadler, 234 N.C. 49, 65 S.E. (2d) 345 (1951)
(full faith and credit to decree obtained upon petitioner's submission); Hardee v. Mitchell,
230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E. (2d) 884 (1949); In re Biggers, 228 N.C. 531, 47 S.E. (2d) 32
(1948); or Ex parte Means, 176 N.C. 307, 97 S.E. 39 (1918); supra note 58. See in
general note, 30 N.C. L. Rav. 282 (1952).
140 See In re Francis, 75 N.E. (2d) 700 (Ohio Prob.), appeal dismissed 77 N.E. (2d)
289 (1947), where the court denied recognition inter alia on the ground that the party
seeking such recognition had himself been guilty of defiance to the foreign decree. See also
Anderson v. May, 157 Ohio St. 436, 105 N.E. (2d) 648 (1952), (app. filed, 21 L.W.
3071) giving full faith and credit to custody decree of Wisconsin court from whose jurisdiction children were unlawfully withheld.
141 Hatcher v. Hatcher, (Okla. 1952) 244 P. (2d) 480; Remick v. Remick, 204 Okla.
345, 229 P. (2d) 600 (1951); Ex parte Miller, 201 Okla. 499, 207 P. (2d) 290 (1949);
Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83 at 84, 289 P. 740 (1930) ("Before the courts of this
state will disregard a judgment of a court of a sister state awarding the custody of a minor
child, it must be shown that the minor child was brought into this state by a person having
the lawful custody thereoP'). Cf. Gaunt v. Gaunt, 160 Okla. 195, 16 P. (2d) 580 (1932).
142 See Lingel v. Maudlin, 188 Ore. 147, 212 P. (2d) 751 (1949), language to the
contrary notwithstanding; and even more clearly Application of Lorenz, (Ore. 1952) 241
P. (2d) 142 at 146 ("surreptitious removal of the children from the jurisdiction of the
Indiana court"). Cf. Ex parte Quinn, (Ore. 1951) 233 P. (2d) 767 at 772 (dictum).
But see the modification case Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 78, 187 P. 598 (1920).
143 Pyles v. Pyles, 157 Pa. Super. 450, 4.3 A. (2d) 651 (1945). Cf. Commonwealth
ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 167 Pa. Super. 470, 75 A. (2d) 614 (1950) supra note 63.
Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W. (2d) 60 (1950) mentions four Pennsylvania
cases as giving "no controlling consideration to the violation of a court order in the removal
of a minor child." Commonwealth ex rel. Pukas v. Pukas, 164 Pa. Super. 488, 66 A. (2d)
315 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. McTighe v. Lindsey, 155 Pa. Super. 560, 40 A. (2d)
881 (1945); In re Rosenthal, 103 Pa. Super. 27, 157 A. 342 (1931); Commonwealth ex
rel. Sage v. Sage, 160 Pa. 399, 28 A. 863 (1894). None of these cases involved disobedience to the custody decree of a sister state. Cf. Cochran's Estate, 28 Pa. Co. 33 (1902).

144 In this state several recent lower court decisions follow this trend. See Roberts v.
Tippett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) 239 S.W. (2d) 859; Burckhart v. Bachrach, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950) 225 S.W. (2d) 1022; Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) 219
S.W. (2d) 519. The Supreme Court of the state, in Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489 at 496,
208 S.W. (2d) 876 (1948), while not concerned with a foreign decree, indicated that it
might refuse to follow the practice of those states which do not ".•• decline jurisdiction
even where the child is brought into the state in plain violation of a valid court order of
another state." [Incidentally the only authority cited for such a practice is 107 A.L.R. 642
which fails to establish this proposition.] This assumption is supported by the court's
reliance on Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S.W. (2d) 165 (1938), where the
court, at 148, in asserting "jurisdiction," stressed the fact that "here the child was rightfully
in Texas in the custody of its mother" whose "custody was legal." Exception will apparently be made in favor of spouses disobeying foreign decrees in cases of overruling equitable
considerations such as !aches [Avenier v. Avenier, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 216 S.W. (2d)
638 (besides involving decree of court of foreign country)]. In Duncan v. Duncan, (Tex.
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Alabama, California, Colorado, Tennessee and Washington,149 would,
in the virtual absence of authority to the contrary, well be held to represent prevailing authority. This approach is strongly supported by the
decision of the Tenth Circuit in Crocker v. Crocker 49 n where plaintiff
was held entitled to damages for having been temporarily deprived of
Civ. App. 1946) 197 S.W. (2d) 229, the court, while failing to reverse a trial court ruling
refusing recognition, referred to that ruling as "somewhat paradoxical." Neither of the
cases cited in Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W. (2d) 60 (1950), as contrary to
the clean hands doctrine is in point. Bowman v. Bridges, (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) 220 S.W.
(2d) 512 at 515, itself refuses to "put a premium on the wrongful act"; and Blackv. Adams,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 214 S.W. (2d) 703, even fails to concern a foreign custody decree.
Nor is Ex parte Birmingham, (Texas 1952) 244 S.W. (2d) 977, to the contrary, where
the court declared irrelevant the surreptitious removal in accordance with a foreign decree. And see Worden v. Worden, 148 Tex. 356, 224 S.W. (2d) 187 (1949), affirming
an order to restore the child to foreign custody from which it had been removed by force.
J.45 See White v. White, 138 Conn. l, 81 A. (2d) 450 (1951) (denial of full faith
and credit to a custody decree for the mother after removal of the child without the
father's consent), fully discussed by Rheinstein, "Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody,"
26 CoNN. B. J. 48 (1952) [see also notes, 25 CoNN. B. J. 413 (1951), 26 CoNN. B. J. 41
(1952)]; and dissent in Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A. (2d) 521 (1948).
See also supra note 60, infra note 166.
J.46 Two judges in Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296 at 331, 41 N.W. (2d) 60 (1950),
commending the Washington rule, dissented on the ground that "the majority opinion,
while apparently in accord with the weight of authority, . . . is an open invitation to divorced parents, who have had their day in a court of competent jurisdiction, to bring by
stealth or force into this state, children to whose custody they have been denied and thus
avoid the effect of a legal decree." See also the strong dissent of four judges in McKee v.
McKee, 239 Iowa 1093, 32 N.W. (2d) 379 (1948), and the opinion by one of the
dissenting judges in McKee v. Murrow, 241 Iowa 434, 40 N.W. (2d) 924 (1950). For
other Iowa decisions see infra notes 166 et seq., and Pelton v. ~alverson, 240 Iowa 184, 35
N.W. (2d) 759 (1949) (Iowa jurisdiction to change California decree-children in Iowa
with petitioner's consent). The 26 cases on which the majority in the Helton case relies
as giving "controlling consideration to the violation of a court order in the removal of a
minor child from a court's jurisdiction," includes cases such as Ex parte Memmi, 80 Cal.
App. (2d) 295, 181 P. (2d) 885 (1947), or the Pennsylvania (supra note 143) and Texas
cases (supra note 144).
147White v. White, 160 Kan. 32, 159 P. (2d) 461 (1945) (where the court, though
protesting its freedom of discretion, in effect enforced a California decree against the defiant resident father); Moyer v. Moyer, 171 Kan. 495, 233 P. (2d) 711 (1951) (semble).
J.47n See Conley v. Conley, 324 Mass. 530 at 534, 87 N.E. (2d) 153 (1949), maintaining its own jurisdiction against a fugitive father to discourage "the flouting of court
decrees and the despicable practice of child snatching"; and Welker v. Welker, 325 Mass.
738, 92 N.E. (2d) 373 (1950), modifying a foreign decree favoring a fugitive mother.
See also Henderson v. Henderson, (Mass. 1952) 107 N.E. (2d) 773.
148 See Briggs v. Briggs, 111 Utah 418, 181 P. (2d) 223 (1947); Cooke v. Cooke,
67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926), cited with approval in Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73,
202 P. (2d) 550 (1949).
149 See supra notes 130a (Alabama), 91 et seq. (California), 130 (Colorado), 129
(Tennessee) and 120 et seq. (Washington).
149a Crocker v. Crocker, (10th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 236.
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her child's custody, awarded to her by a court of a sister state, by the
child's removal into the trial court's jurisdiction.

E. Apparent Exceptions
To be sure there are a number of cases in which courts have refused
to recognize or did recognize custody decrees of sister states without
apparent regard to the "clean hands" of the benefiting parent. Close
analysis, disregarding inconclusive reasoning in the traditional terms
of jurisdiction and change of circumstances, permits, however, classification of a large majority of such cases under other, more realistic,
equitable considerations.1uo

I. Modi-fication despite petitioner's unclean hands. In Cook 11.
Cook161 the court awarded custody to a mother contrary to a New York
decree although she had, in violation of that decree, refused to return
the child after a vacation. We can probably assume that the court, while
basing its decision on a "change of circumstances," was determined by
the fact that the paternal grandfather had not claimed his rights for a
considerable period and had himself violated the prior decree by favoring the father. Similarly, the court in Helton 11. Crawley1 52 or in the
Gilman115~ case had no misgivings about giving the abducting parent
preference over a foster home or a grandparent.154 Again, in two other
cases, similar modifications, though purportedly based on a change of
150 The writer of the annotation in 107 A.L.R. 642 (1937, no supplement), "after an
extensive search," was able to adduce only two cases as supporting the proposition that the
child's unlawful removal will not preclude re-examination by the second state of the first
decree: Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 27 P. (2d) 1038 (1933), which, however,
merely refuses to recognize a foreign decree of modification "as a part of the punishment"
of the disobedient parent, a generally accepted rule not bearing upon the here relevant
question; (as to more recent Colorado decisions see supra note 130); and Sheehy v. Sheehy,
88 N.H. 223, 186 A. 1 (1936) (based on the interpretation of a New Hampshire residence
statute). Similarly the note in 32 CoL. L. REv. 383 (1932), maintaining a position contrary
to the clean hands rule here advocated, refers to cases not here pertinent: In Barnett v.
Blakeley, 202 Iowa 1, 209 N.W. 412 (1926), a father prevailed over a grandparent; in Calkins v. Calkins, 217 Ala. 378, 115 S. 866 (1928), full faith and credit was denied in reliance on the law of the first forum, Kansas (supra note 52 et seq.) (for the law of Alabama
see supra note 131). In Ex parte Leu, 240 Mich. 240, 215 N.W. 384 (1927), the unlawful
retention was not discussed.
151 Cook v. Cook, (D.C. Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 945. Cf. supra note 132.
152Helton v. Crowley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W. (2d) 60 (1950), discussed note, 5
MIAMI L.Q. 312 (1951). Cf. supra note 146, infra note 166 et seq.
153 Gilman v. Morgan, 158 Fla. 605, 29 S. (2d) 372 (1947), cert den. 331 U.S. 796
(1947). See supra note 61a.
154 See also supra note 132.
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circumstances, were clearly induced by the fact that the mother's malfeasance was held justi:6.ed by the father's threats155 or prior waiver.1116
And in Eddy v. Staufer1 57 the child's choice was given decisive weight~
while in Brown v. Brown158 the :6.rst court's failure to give full faith and
credit to the forum's decree apparently resulted in retortion.
2. N onenforcement despite respondent's unclean hands. In the
course of the present analysis it has appeared repeatedly that a majority
of those cases relied on by those courts and writers rejecting the clean
hands approach involved the denial of full faith and credit to foreign
decrees depriving, on the mere ground of his disobedience,159 a spouse
now within the forum's jurisdiction of a custody previously granted.
Indeed, it is submitted that this practice is a general one and should be
recognized as an exception to, though not as a refutation of, the clean
hands doctrine here suggested. It is further submitted that this exception can be fully rationalized on the ground that courts, though anxious
to prevent dissatis:6.ed parents from kidnapping their children for the
mere purpose of re-trying a lost cause, are reluctant to execute a discipline imposed by a foreign court without primary regard to the child's
welfare.160
The case is rare where refusal to recognize a foreign decree violated
by that spouse opposing it cannot thus be rationalized.161 At least in
155 Ferguson v. State, 251 Ala. 645, 38 S. (2d) 853 (1949). Cf. supra note 130a.
l56 Brown v. Parsons, 136 N.J. Eq. 493, 42 A. (2d) 852 (1945). Cf. supra note 62.
157£ddy v. Stauffer, 160 Fla. 944, 37 S. (2d) 417 (1948). Cf. supra notes 61a, 153.
On Florida law see note, I UNIV. FLA. L. RBv. 360 (1948); and Alpert, "Custody Incident
to Divorce in Florida," 2 MIAMI L.Q. 33 (1947).
15BBrown v. Brown, 104 Cal. App. (2d) 88,230 P. (2d) 651 (1951). Cf. supra note
91 et seq.; also note 22.
159 See e.g., People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 27 P. (2d) 1038 (1933).
See, e.g., supra notes 21, 130, 137; and Cole v. Cole, 68 Idaho 561, 201 P. (2d) 98
(1948); Dawson v. Dawson, (Mo. App. 1951) 241 S.W. (2d) 725. Cf. Beclanann v.
Beclanann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W. (2d) 566 (1949) (no foreign decree, children's removal therefore no bar to jurisdiction).
160 For an express statement of this rationale see Gaunt v. Gaunt, 160 Okla. 195, 16
P. (2d) 579 (1932); cf. supra note 141. The following cases, seemingly contrary to the
clean hands doctrine, can also, I believe, be rationalized on this ground. Griffin v. Griffin,
95 Ore. 78, 187 P. 598 (1920) (see also supra note 142); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H.
223, 186 A. I (1936) Avenier v. Avenier, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 216 S.W. (2d) 638
(though unhappily distinguishing between illegal removal and illegal retention); Milner v.
Gatlin, 139 Ga. 109, 76 S.E. 860 (1912) (supra note 133). In general see notes, 80
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 712 at 716 (1932); 15 BROOKLYN L.J. 290 at 294 (1950).
161 STOMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 330 (1951), mentions as such a case
Digirogio v. Digirogio, 153 Fla. 24, 13 S. (2d) 596 (1943). All the court held in that
case, however, was that the Florida court, notwithstanding the petitioner's malfeasance, had
jurisdiction to modify a prior California award. For the aftermath of this case see Di Giorgio
v. Di Giorgio, 87 Cal. App. (2d) 576, 197 P. (2d) 213 (1948).
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one case the appellate court, while refusing to reverse such a decision,
expressed its criticism based on the considerations here discussed. 162
And in other cases unexpressed doubt as to the jurisdiction of a migratory divorce court may have prompted the court.163
3. Recognition regardless of clean hands. In several recent cases
the court refused to re-examine a foreign decree notwithstanding the
fact that the spouse asking for such re-examination had in no way misconducted himself. But in such cases the court will stress with particular vigor its free discretion which might also have supported the opposite conclusion.164 Similar protestations will be found in those few cases
in which courts, because of their growing desire to remove the child
from his parents' controversy, have refused to treat a parent's defiance
of a foreign decree by itself as a ground for a change of custody.165
Even in Iowa, one of the few states in which full faith and credit to
foreign custody decrees will apparently be upheld even in the face of
respondent's malfeasance, discretionary factors largely determine the
decision. In McKee v. McKee166 an Iowa court had given custody to
the mother, reserving to the father a mere right of visitation. During
the child's visit to his home in Texas the father sought and obtained in
that state a modification of the Iowa decree awarding complete custody
to him. The mother, however, then in Iowa, having recovered the child
"by force" prior to the issuance of the Texas decree, sought and obtained full custody of the child. Upon the father's appeal the Supreme
Court of Iowa, apparently maintaining the tradition of Wake-field v.
Ives,1 61 reversed with mere reference to the full faith and credit due
the Texas decree in the absence of a proved change of circumstances.
But the authority of this decision as supporting constitutional recognition seems weak both in view of a strong dissent by four out of nine
judges who led the court in a sequel of this case giving custody to the
1 62 Scott v. Scott, 227
1 0s See, e.g., Smith v.

Ind. 396, 86 N.E. (2d) 533 (1949).
Smith, 4 Ter. 268, 45 A. (2d) 879 (Del. 1946).
1 64 Cf. ex parte Miller, 201 Okla. 499, 207 P. (2d) 290 (1949) (cf. supra note 141).
l65 See, e.g., Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 82 N.E. (2d) 219 (1948) (on Massachusetts law see supra note 147a); People ex rel. Turk v. Turk, 86 N.Y.S. (2d) 139
(1949) (on New York law see supra note 69).
166 McKee v. McKee, 239 Iowa 1093, 32 N.W. (2d) 379 (1948). See also Helton
v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W. (2d) 60 (1950). Cf. Addy v. Addy, 240 Iowa 255,
36 N.W. (2d) 352 (1949); Barnett v. Blakeley, 202 Iowa 1, 209 N.W. 412 (1926). But
cf. Boor v. Boor, 241 Iowa 973, 43 N.W. (2d) 155 (1950) (denial of foreign jurisdiction
and changed circumstances); and the much cited case of Kline v. Kline, 57 Iowa 386, 10
N.W. 825 (1881). For a criticism of the first case see note, Custody of Children and the
Conflict of Laws, 1 DRAXE L. REv. 18 at 24 (1951).
167 Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Iowa 238 (1872).
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mother,1 67 a and because the court may originally have given weight to
the fact that the mother, too, had sought the jurisdiction of the Iowa
court with unclean hands. A general conscious observance of the clean
hands approach as the primary basis for the recognition of foreign decrees would have prevented outrageous cases such as that presented in
Crowell v. Crowell,1 68 where the Oregon court was compelled to choose
between the enforcement of five foreign decrees between the issuance
of which the child had been kidnapped twice by the father and three
times by the mother.

F. Ultimate Solutions
A modification in this sense of our present formulas would express,
on the one hand, the B.exibility of the standards actually applied, and,
on the other hand, the determination of most courts to prevent willful
evasion of sister state decrees. A fully satisfactory solution, however,
cannot be found, I believe, as long as a child's custody is decided upon
within the framework of adversary proceedings developed and suited
for the preservation of rights and duties of litigants, rather than for the
ex officio investigation of the child's welfare. What in other countries
has come to be known as "extralitigious" proceedings, instituted and
prosecuted by the state as parens patriae without regard to the cooperation or the resistance of feuding parties,169 should perhaps be studied
with a view to eventual adoption by uniform legislative action. Under
such a procedure all courts in the United States would, on their mvn
initiative, cooperate in child custody cases, exchanging freely both information and assistance. Under such a scheme there would be no
doubt but that, while "full faith and credit" or comity is due in cases
of attempted evasion, otherwise any court must fully cooperate in any
scrutiny to which its decree may be subjected in any sister state.
The Uniform Support of Dependents Act, now in force in ten
states, has shown the way in which such cooperation between courts
can easily be achieved within the American system of administration of
v. Murrow, 241 Iowa 434, 40 N.W. (2d) 924 (1950).
v. Crowell, 184 Ore. 467, 198 P. (24) 992 (1948). Cf. supra note 142.
169 See, e.g., §111 of the Austrian Jurisdiktionsnorm which provides in matters of
custody or guardianship that any court may "transfer its jurisdiction in whole or in part"
to any other court wherever this appears to be in the interest of the ward. This authorization includes transfers of jurisdiction to courts of foreign countries. See also the Hague
Guardianship Convention of June 12, 1902.
167a McKee
168 Crowell

1953]

INTERSTATE R:acoGNITION oF CusTonY DECREES

373

justice. Under that act support proceedings may be brought on behalf
of a child in his own court without regard to whether or not personal
service can be obtained upon the father. In the latter case the judge
will transmit the petition to a court which can effect such service, and
subsequent proceedings will be carried on in cooperation between the
petitioner's and the defendant's court.170
Conclusions

I. The Restatement formula requiring "enforcement" of foreign
custody decrees subject only to a finding of absence of foreign jurisdiction or change of circumstances, has proved to be both too rigid and
too 8.exible: too rigid in requiring recognition and enforcement without
regard to the child's welfare, and too Hexible in permitting nonrecognition and nonenforcement, even in favor of a parent "fugitive
from justice," upon a mere "change of circumstances" which can be
found at will.
2. This result has induced the courts of several states to adopt the
"Kansas rule" completely discarding the Restatement approach and
purporting to exercise unlimited discretion.
3. Factual analysis proves, however, that American courts, though
frequently invoking the Restatement or the Kansas rule have in effect
failed to follow either. Rather, while clearly feeling free at any time in
the child's interest to change custody or to refuse to enforce a foreign
decree, most courts will refrain from such action in certain typical situations, in which the change or nonenforcement of a foreign decree
would benefit a parent with "unclean hands." This practice (here referred to as the "Washington rule") does not extend, however, to the
recognition or enforcement of the decree of a foreign court modifying
170 Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, §11 et seq., 9A U.L.A., Supp.
1951, 18, 26. See also new §13 et seq. amendments approved at the meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners of September 8-13, 1952. Legalistic objections to this
procedure based on the doctrine of separation of powers have been successfully met, as have
been doubts as to whether the courts of two sovereigns may participate in the disposition of
a single case. Comment, "The New Uniform Support of Dependents Act," 45 Ju.. L. RBv.
252 (1950). See also International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Recognition and the Enforcement Abroad of Maintenance Obligations (Rome 1950) with an Appendix setting forth the laws of the several
countries. For a proposal of a uniform act based on a jurisdictional approach, see note
Strategy for Child Custody Suits Involving Conflict of Laws, 2 Dmrn B.J. 11 (1951).
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its previous award merely or primarily for the purpose of punishing
disobedience.
4. Conscious application of these rules now effective though contrary to traditional language, would greatly clarify and render more
predictable decisions in interstate custody cases. An ultimate solution
of the present difficulties in this field, however, must await legislative
action which would provide for the close cooperation ex officio between
American courts in what has elsewhere developed as "extralitigious
proceedings" in the sole interest of the child's welfare.

